Category Archives: Advisories

ZDI-22-719: Autodesk 3DS Max TIF File Parsing Out-Of-Bounds Write Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

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This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Autodesk 3DS Max. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.

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CVE-2018-25033

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ADMesh through 0.98.4 has a heap-based buffer over-read in stl_update_connects_remove_1 (called from stl_remove_degenerate) in connect.c in libadmesh.a.

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Ransom.Satana / Code Execution

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Posted by malvuln on May 07

Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022
Original source:
https://malvuln.com/advisory/46bfd4f1d581d7c0121d2b19a005d3df.txt
Contact: malvuln13 () gmail com
Media: twitter.com/malvuln

Threat: Ransom.Satana
Vulnerability: Code Execution
Description: Satana searches for and loads a DLL named “wow64log.dll” in
WindowsSystem32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and
terminate the malware pre-encryption….

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Ransom.Conti / Code Execution

Read Time:20 Second

Posted by malvuln on May 07

Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022
Original source:
https://malvuln.com/advisory/20f0c736a966142de88dee06a2e4a5b1.txt
Contact: malvuln13 () gmail com
Media: twitter.com/malvuln

Threat: Ransom.Conti
Vulnerability: Code Execution
Description: Conti looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory.
Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vuln DLL execute our own code,
control and terminate the malware pre-encryption….

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Ransom.Petya / Code Execution

Read Time:20 Second

Posted by malvuln on May 07

Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022
Original source:
https://malvuln.com/advisory/8ed9a60127aee45336102bf12059a850.txt
Contact: malvuln13 () gmail com
Media: twitter.com/malvuln

Threat: Ransom.Petya
Vulnerability: Code Execution
Description: Petya looks for and loads a DLL named “wow64log.dll” in
WindowsSystem32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and
terminate the malware pre-encryption. The…

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