Nice Linear eMerge Command Injection Vulnerability (CVE-2019–7256)

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What is the vulnerability?

Cyber threat actors are actively targeting Linear eMerge E3-Series to exploit a 5-year-old critical vulnerability. The vulnerability tracked as CVE-2019-7256 is a command injection flaw that could allow an attacker to cause remote code execution and full access to the system.

The Nice Linear eMerge E3-Series is a popular access control system used in various commercial and industrial environments worldwide which underscores the importance of the potential widespread impact of this vulnerability.

What is the recommended Mitigation?

Nice has released a security bulletin that advises users to apply the latest firmware to mitigate the risk and recommends defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation. https://linear-solutions.com/wp-content/uploads/Service-Bulletin-for-Telephone-Entry-Products-04-12-2023.pdf

What FortiGuard Coverage is available?

FortiGuard Labs has an existing IPS signature “Linear.eMerge.card_scan_decoder.php.Command.Injection” to block any attack attempts targeting the vulnerability and has an OT virtual patch available for auto-patching.
Fortinet customers remain protected by the vulnerability; however, it is recommended to apply firmware patches released by the vendor to mitigate any risks.

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micropython-1.22.2-1.fc41

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FEDORA-2024-9f2a705459

Packages in this update:

micropython-1.22.2-1.fc41

Update description:

Automatic update for micropython-1.22.2-1.fc41.

Changelog

* Fri Mar 22 2024 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> – 1.22.2-1
– Update to 1.22.2
– Security fixes for CVE-2023-7158 and CVE-2023-7152
– Fixes: rhbz#2256176, rhbz#2256178, rhbz#2259215
* Thu Jan 25 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> – 1.21.0-3
– Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
* Sun Jan 21 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> – 1.21.0-2
– Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild

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Recent ‘MFA Bombing’ Attacks Targeting Apple Users

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Several Apple customers recently reported being targeted in elaborate phishing attacks that involve what appears to be a bug in Apple’s password reset feature. In this scenario, a target’s Apple devices are forced to display dozens of system-level prompts that prevent the devices from being used until the recipient responds “Allow” or “Don’t Allow” to each prompt. Assuming the user manages not to fat-finger the wrong button on the umpteenth password reset request, the scammers will then call the victim while spoofing Apple support in the caller ID, saying the user’s account is under attack and that Apple support needs to “verify” a one-time code.

Some of the many notifications Patel says he received from Apple all at once.

Parth Patel is an entrepreneur who is trying to build a startup in the cryptocurrency space. On March 23, Patel documented on Twitter/X a recent phishing campaign targeting him that involved what’s known as a “push bombing” or “MFA fatigue” attack, wherein the phishers abuse a feature or weakness of a multi-factor authentication (MFA) system in a way that inundates the target’s device(s) with alerts to approve a password change or login.

“All of my devices started blowing up, my watch, laptop and phone,” Patel told KrebsOnSecurity. “It was like this system notification from Apple to approve [a reset of the account password], but I couldn’t do anything else with my phone. I had to go through and decline like 100-plus notifications.”

Some people confronted with such a deluge may eventually click “Allow” to the incessant password reset prompts — just so they can use their phone again. Others may inadvertently approve one of these prompts, which will also appear on a user’s Apple watch if they have one.

But the attackers in this campaign had an ace up their sleeves: Patel said after denying all of the password reset prompts from Apple, he received a call on his iPhone that said it was from Apple Support (the number displayed was 1-800-275-2273, Apple’s real customer support line).

“I pick up the phone and I’m super suspicious,” Patel recalled. “So I ask them if they can verify some information about me, and after hearing some aggressive typing on his end he gives me all this information about me and it’s totally accurate.”

All of it, that is, except his real name. Patel said when he asked the fake Apple support rep to validate the name they had on file for the Apple account, the caller gave a name that was not his but rather one that Patel has only seen in background reports about him that are for sale at a people-search website called PeopleDataLabs.

Patel said he has worked fairly hard to remove his information from multiple people-search websites, and he found PeopleDataLabs uniquely and consistently listed this inaccurate name as an alias on his consumer profile.

“For some reason, PeopleDataLabs has three profiles that come up when you search for my info, and two of them are mine but one is an elementary school teacher from the midwest,” Patel said. “I asked them to verify my name and they said Anthony.”

Patel said the goal of the voice phishers is to trigger an Apple ID reset code to be sent to the user’s device, which is a text message that includes a one-time password. If the user supplies that one-time code, the attackers can then reset the password on the account and lock the user out. They can also then remotely wipe all of the user’s Apple devices.

THE PHONE NUMBER IS KEY

Chris is a cryptocurrency hedge fund owner who asked that only his first name be used so as not to paint a bigger target on himself. Chris told KrebsOnSecurity he experienced a remarkably similar phishing attempt in late February.

“The first alert I got I hit ‘Don’t Allow’, but then right after that I got like 30 more notifications in a row,” Chris said. “I figured maybe I sat on my phone weird, or was accidentally pushing some button that was causing these, and so I just denied them all.”

Chris says the attackers persisted hitting his devices with the reset notifications for several days after that, and at one point he received a call on his iPhone that said it was from Apple support.

“I said I would call them back and hung up,” Chris said, demonstrating the proper response to such unbidden solicitations. “When I called back to the real Apple, they couldn’t say whether anyone had been in a support call with me just then. They just said Apple states very clearly that it will never initiate outbound calls to customers — unless the customer requests to be contacted.”

Massively freaking out that someone was trying to hijack his digital life, Chris said he changed his passwords and then went to an Apple store and bought a new iPhone. From there, he created a new Apple iCloud account using a brand new email address.

Chris said he then proceeded to get even more system alerts on his new iPhone and iCloud account — all the while still sitting at the local Apple Genius Bar.

Chris told KrebsOnSecurity his Genius Bar tech was mystified about the source of the alerts, but Chris said he suspects that whatever the phishers are abusing to rapidly generate these Apple system alerts requires knowing the phone number on file for the target’s Apple account. After all, that was the only aspect of Chris’s new iPhone and iCloud account that hadn’t changed.

WATCH OUT!

“Ken” is a security industry veteran who spoke on condition of anonymity. Ken said he first began receiving these unsolicited system alerts on his Apple devices earlier this year, but that he has not received any phony Apple support calls as others have reported.

“This recently happened to me in the middle of the night at 12:30 a.m.,” Ken said. “And even though I have my Apple watch set to remain quiet during the time I’m usually sleeping at night, it woke me up with one of these alerts. Thank god I didn’t press ‘Allow,’ which was the first option shown on my watch. I had to scroll watch the wheel to see and press the ‘Don’t Allow’ button.”

Ken shared this photo he took of an alert on his watch that woke him up at 12:30 a.m. Ken said he had to scroll on the watch face to see the “Don’t Allow” button.

Unnerved by the idea that he could have rolled over on his watch while sleeping and allowed criminals to take over his Apple account, Ken said he contacted the real Apple support and was eventually escalated to a senior Apple engineer. The engineer assured Ken that turning on an Apple Recovery Key for his account would stop the notifications once and for all.

A recovery key is an optional security feature that Apple says “helps improve the security of your Apple ID account.” It is a randomly generated 28-character code, and when you enable a recovery key it is supposed to disable Apple’s standard account recovery process. The thing is, enabling it is not a simple process, and if you ever lose that code in addition to all of your Apple devices you will be permanently locked out.

Ken said he enabled a recovery key for his account as instructed, but that it hasn’t stopped the unbidden system alerts from appearing on all of his devices every few days.

KrebsOnSecurity tested Ken’s experience, and can confirm that enabling a recovery key does nothing to stop a password reset prompt from being sent to associated Apple devices. Visiting Apple’s “forgot password” page — https://iforgot.apple.com — asks for an email address and for the visitor to solve a CAPTCHA.

After that, the page will display the last two digits of the phone number tied to the Apple account. Filling in the missing digits and hitting submit on that form will send a system alert, whether or not the user has enabled an Apple Recovery Key.

The password reset page at iforgot.apple.com.

RATE LIMITS

What sanely designed authentication system would send dozens of requests for a password change in the span of a few moments, when the first requests haven’t even been acted on by the user? Could this be the result of a bug in Apple’s systems?

Apple has not yet responded to requests for comment.

Throughout 2022, a criminal hacking group known as LAPSUS$ used MFA bombing to great effect in intrusions at Cisco, Microsoft and Uber. In response, Microsoft began enforcing “MFA number matching,” a feature that displays a series of numbers to a user attempting to log in with their credentials. These numbers must then be entered into the account owner’s Microsoft authenticator app on their mobile device to verify they are logging into the account.

Kishan Bagaria is a hobbyist security researcher and engineer who founded the website texts.com (now owned by Automattic), and he’s convinced Apple has a problem on its end. In August 2019, Bagaria reported to Apple a bug that allowed an exploit he dubbed “AirDoS” because it could be used to let an attacker infinitely spam all nearby iOS devices with a system-level prompt to share a file via AirDrop — a file-sharing capability built into Apple products.

Apple fixed that bug nearly four months later in December 2019, thanking Bagaria in the associated security bulletin. Bagaria said Apple’s fix for that bug was to add stricter rate limiting on AirDrop requests, and he suspects that someone has figured out a way to bypass Apple’s rate limit on how many of these password reset requests can be sent in a given timeframe.

“I think this could be a legit Apple rate limit bug that should be reported,” Bagaria said.

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Avoid Making Costly Mistakes with Your Mobile Payment Apps

Read Time:4 Minute, 50 Second

There used to be a time when one roommate split the cost of rent with another by writing a check. Who still owns a checkbook these days? Of course, those days are nearly long gone, in large part thanks to “peer to peer” (P2P) mobile payment apps, like Venmo, Zelle, or Cash AppNow with a simple click on an app, you can transfer your friend money for brunch before you even leave the tableYet for all their convenience, P2P mobile payment apps could cost you a couple of bucks or more if you’re not on the lookout for things like fraud. The good news is that there are some straightforward ways to protect yourself. 

You likely have one of these apps on your phone alreadyIf so, you’re among the many. It’s estimated that 49% of adults in the U.S. use mobile payment apps like these

Yet with all those different apps come different policies and protections associated with them. So, if you ever get stuck with a bum charge, it may not always be so easy to get your money back. 

With that, here are seven quick tips for using your P2P mobile payment apps safely.

1. Add extra protection with your face, finger, or PIN. 

In addition to securing your account with a strong password, go into your settings and set up your app to use a PIN code, facial ID, or fingerprint ID. (And make sure you’re locking your phone the same way too.) This provides an additional layer of protection in the event your phone is stolen or lost and someone, other than you, tries to make a payment with it.  

2. Get a request or make a test before you pay in full. 

What’s worse than sending money to the wrong person? When paying a friend for the first time, have them make a payment request for you. This way, you can be sure that you’re sending money to the right person. With the freedom to create account names however one likes, a small typo can end up as a donation to a complete stranger. To top it off, that money could be gone for good! 

Another option is to make a test payment. Sending a small amount to that new account lets both of you know that the routing is right and that a full payment can be made with confidence. 

3. You can’t always issue a “hold” or “stop payment” with mobile payment apps. 

Bye, bye, bye! Unlike some other payment methods, new mobile payment apps don’t have a way to dispute a charge, cancel a payment, or otherwise use some sort of recall or retrieval feature. If anything, this reinforces the thought above—be sure that you’re absolutely making the payment to the right person. 

4. When you can, use your app with a credit card. 

Credit cards offer a couple of clear advantages over debit cards when using them in association with mobile payment apps (and online shopping for that matter too). Essentially, they can protect you better from fraud: 

Debit cards immediately remove cash from your account when a payment is made, whereas credit card payments appear as charges—which can be contested in the case of fraud. 

In the U.S., if your credit card is lost or stolen, you can report the loss and you will have no further responsibility for charges you didn’t make. Additionally, liability for each card lost or stolen is $50. Debit cards don’t enjoy these same protections. 

5. Fraudulent charge … lost or stolen card? Report it right away. 

Report any activity like this immediately to your financial institution. Timing can be of the essence in terms of limiting your liabilities and losses. For additional info, check out this article from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that outlines what to do if your debit or credit card is stolen and what your liabilities are.  

Also, note the following guidance from the FTC on payment apps: 

“New mobile apps and forms of payment may not provide these same protections. That means it might not always be easy to get your money back if something goes wrong. Make sure you understand the protections and assurances your payment services provider offers with their service.”  

6. Watch out for cybercrooks cashing in on mobile payment app scams. 

It’s sad but true. Crooks are setting up all kinds of scams that use mobile payment apps. A popular one involves creating fake charities or posing as legitimate ones and then asking for funds by mobile payment. To avoid getting scammed, check and see if the charity is legit. The FTC suggests researching resources like Better Business Bureau’s Wise Giving Alliance, Charity Navigator, Charity Watch or,  GuideStar. 

Overall, the FTC further recommends the following to keep yourself from getting scammed: 

Review the app’s fraud protection policies and understand whether and how you can recover funds if a problem arises. 
Be wary of any business that only accepts P2P payment apps or pre-paid debit card payments. Consider this a red flag. 
Never send P2P payments to, or accept payments from, someone you don’t know. 
Don’t use P2P payment apps for purchasing goods or services. As noted above, you may not get the consumer protections a credit or debit card can offer. 

7. Protect your phone 

With so much of your life on your phone, getting security software installed on it can protect you and the things you keep on your phone. Whether you’re an Android owner or iOS owner, mobile security software can keep your data, shopping, and payments secure. 

The post Avoid Making Costly Mistakes with Your Mobile Payment Apps appeared first on McAfee Blog.

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