FEDORA-EPEL-2024-a7417a00b4
Packages in this update:
python-asyncssh-2.13.2-4.el9
Update description:
Backport upstream fix for CVE-2023-46445 and CVE-2023-46446.
python-asyncssh-2.13.2-4.el9
Backport upstream fix for CVE-2023-46445 and CVE-2023-46446.
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki discovered that the Xen event channel
infrastructure implementation in the Linux kernel contained a race
condition. An attacker in a guest VM could possibly use this to cause a
denial of service (paravirtualized device unavailability). (CVE-2023-34324)
Zheng Wang discovered a use-after-free in the Renesas Ethernet AVB driver
in the Linux kernel during device removal. A privileged attacker could use
this to cause a denial of service (system crash). (CVE-2023-35827)
It was discovered that a race condition existed in the Linux kernel when
performing operations with kernel objects, leading to an out-of-bounds
write. A local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service (system
crash) or execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2023-45863)
黄思聪 discovered that the NFC Controller Interface (NCI) implementation in
the Linux kernel did not properly handle certain memory allocation failure
conditions, leading to a null pointer dereference vulnerability. A local
attacker could use this to cause a denial of service (system crash).
(CVE-2023-46343)
No, three million smart toothbrushes didn’t launch a DDoS attack against a Swiss company.
libgit2_1.6-1.6.5-1.fc39
Update to 1.6.5
Resolves: CVE-2024-24577
Resolves: CVE-2024-24575
libgit2-1.7.2-1.fc39
Update to 1.7.2
Resolves: CVE-2024-24577
Resolves: CVE-2024-24575
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki discovered that the Xen event channel
infrastructure implementation in the Linux kernel contained a race
condition. An attacker in a guest VM could possibly use this to cause a
denial of service (paravirtualized device unavailability). (CVE-2023-34324)
Zheng Wang discovered a use-after-free in the Renesas Ethernet AVB driver
in the Linux kernel during device removal. A privileged attacker could use
this to cause a denial of service (system crash). (CVE-2023-35827)
Tom Dohrmann discovered that the Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
implementation for AMD processors in the Linux kernel contained a race
condition when accessing MMIO registers. A local attacker in a SEV guest VM
could possibly use this to cause a denial of service (system crash) or
possibly execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2023-46813)
It was discovered that the io_uring subsystem in the Linux kernel contained
a race condition, leading to a null pointer dereference vulnerability. A
local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service (system crash).
(CVE-2023-46862)
It was discovered that the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel did not
properly validate inner tunnel netlink attributes, leading to a null
pointer dereference vulnerability. A local attacker could use this to cause
a denial of service (system crash). (CVE-2023-5972)
It was discovered that the TLS subsystem in the Linux kernel did not
properly perform cryptographic operations in some situations, leading to a
null pointer dereference vulnerability. A local attacker could use this to
cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary
code. (CVE-2023-6176)
Jann Horn discovered that a race condition existed in the Linux kernel when
handling io_uring over sockets, leading to a use-after-free vulnerability.
A local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service (system crash)
or possibly execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2023-6531)
Xingyuan Mo discovered that the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel did
not properly handle dynset expressions passed from userspace, leading to a
null pointer dereference vulnerability. A local attacker could use this to
cause a denial of service (system crash). (CVE-2023-6622)
It was discovered that the TIPC protocol implementation in the Linux kernel
did not properly handle locking during tipc_crypto_key_revoke() operations.
A local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service (kernel
deadlock). (CVE-2024-0641)
The explosive growth of Generative AI has sparked many questions and considerations not just within tech circles, but in mainstream society in general. Both the advancement of the technology, and the easy access means that virtually anyone can leverage these tools, and much of 2023 was spent discovering new ways that Generative AI could be used to solve problems or better our lives.
However, in the rush to apply this transformative technology, we should also keep in mind “Maslow’s Hammer.” Attributed to Abraham Maslow, best known for outlining a hierarchy of needs, Maslow’s Hammer highlights an over-reliance on a single tool, a concept popularly summarized as “If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” As corporations navigate the continuing evolution of AI, we need to be certain that we’re applying it where it makes the most sense, and not just because we can. This will ultimately save time, money, and energy that can be applied to building robust tools and solutions for viable use cases.
Recognizing when to use GenAI and when not to use it is a necessary skill set for full-stack domain-specific data scientists, engineers, and executives.
Running GenAI is expensive and not without tradeoffs. As of today, careless planning of a GenAI application can lead to a negative return on investment (due to the excessive operational cost), scalability and downtime issues (due to limited computing resources), and serious damage to the customer experience and brand reputation (due to the potential generation of improper content, hallucinations, mis/disinformation, misleading advice, etc.). Organizations struggle to control these variables in general, and the negative impacts and limitations must be offset by a huge value proposition.
One interesting aspect that can be observed across industries is the unexpected (but welcomed) side effects of going through the GenAI voyage, as some sort of eye-opening epiphany. How do we balance this risk/reward? What should we be looking at and what are the questions we should be asking to ensure that we’re successfully applying (or not) AI?
Breaking free from the complexity bias: as humans, we tend to favor and give credit to complex solutions only (known as ‘complexity bias’). Unfortunately, this particularly applies to GenAI applications nowadays, as we are influenced and “self-forced” to use GenAI to solve all problems. Just because “it seems to work”, it doesn’t mean it’s the best/optimal solution. It is by following this logic that some teams may have a significant chance of discovering that there are simpler (probably non-GenAI) means of solving some of these real-world problems (or parts of the problem!). Achieving this revelation requires a humble mind that is open to the possibility of considering that we don’t always need the most complex or expensive solution, even if it’s fancy and we can afford it.
It’s not always all or nothing: one aspect that works only for a few companies but not for most is the need to run GenAI all the time. If your business case is not around selling or supporting GenAI infrastructure, then you are likely using GenAI as a tool to accomplish domain-specific goals. If so, what every player in the industry would want is to maximize value while minimizing operational costs. At the current cost of running GenAI, the most obvious answer to achieve that is to avoid running it as much as possible, while still delivering most of the desired value. This delicate trade-off is a smart and elegant way of tackling the problem: not dismissing the value provided by GenAI nor obsessively using it up to the point that yields negative ROI. How do you achieve this? That’s likely the secret sauce of your domain-specific application area.
Ethical downsizing: GenAI models can be (and usually are) quite big. While this might be required for a few scenarios, it’s not necessary for most real-world domain-specific applications, as several GenAI authors are finding out across the industry (e.g., Phi-2). As such, it’s not only important for your business but also for humanity that we learn to downsize and optimize GenAI models as much as possible. It not only brings efficiency to your use case (cost saving, inference speed, lighter footprint, reduced risk, etc.) but also accomplishes a responsible use of the technology that is respectful of human resources. Each time you save a kilowatt or a few seconds of inference per user, you are explicitly contributing to a sustainable future where GenAI is leveraged to maximize value while minimizing environmental impact, and that’s something to be proud of.
Cross the stream where it is shallowest…
The key is to be humble enough to seek the optimal path: keep an open mind to consider non-GenAI solutions to your problems first. If GenAI is truly the best way to go, then find out if you really need to run it all the time or just sometimes. And finally, downsize as much as possible, not just because of cost and speed, but because of social responsibility.
GenAI is clearly having a moment with demonstrated potential. At the same time, being able to recognize the technical and financial downsides of GenAI is as important for the healthy development of the industry. In the same way we don’t use the hammer for every task at home, we should continuously ask: Is this problem worth GenAI? And is the value provided by this technology (when applied to my domain-specific use case) going to exceed the operational shortcomings? It is with this mindset that the industry will make significant and responsible progress in solving problems with a diverse but efficient set of tools. Let’s continue exploring and building the fascinating world of GenAI, without forgetting what our ultimate goals are.
The post Generative AI: Cross the Stream Where it is Shallowest appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Here is an overview of the CIS Benchmarks that the Center for Internet Security updated or released for February 2024.
Over 25 governments and 14 tech companies vowed to fight against the proliferation of commercial spyware
In 2021, the exclusive Russian cybercrime forum Mazafaka was hacked. The leaked user database shows one of the forum’s founders was an attorney who advised Russia’s top hackers on the legal risks of their work, and what to do if they got caught. A review of this user’s hacker identities shows that during his time on the forums he served as an officer in the special forces of the GRU, the foreign military intelligence agency of the Russian Federation.
Launched in 2001 under the tagline “Network terrorism,” Mazafaka would evolve into one of the most guarded Russian-language cybercrime communities. The forum’s member roster includes a Who’s Who of top Russian cybercriminals, and it featured sub-forums for a wide range of cybercrime specialities, including malware, spam, coding and identity theft.
In almost any database leak, the first accounts listed are usually the administrators and early core members. But the Mazafaka user information posted online was not a database file per se, and it was clearly edited, redacted and restructured by whoever released it. As a result, it can be difficult to tell which members are the earliest users.
The original Mazafaka is known to have been launched by a hacker using the nickname “Stalker.” However, the lowest numbered (non-admin) user ID in the Mazafaka database belongs to another individual who used the handle “Djamix,” and the email address djamix@mazafaka[.]ru.
From the forum’s inception until around 2008, Djamix was one of its most active and eloquent contributors. Djamix told forum members he was a lawyer, and nearly all of his posts included legal analyses of various public cases involving hackers arrested and charged with cybercrimes in Russia and abroad.
“Hiding with purely technical parameters will not help in a serious matter,” Djamix advised Maza members in September 2007. “In order to ESCAPE the law, you need to KNOW the law. This is the most important thing. Technical capabilities cannot overcome intelligence and cunning.”
Stalker himself credited Djamix with keeping Mazafaka online for so many years. In a retrospective post published to Livejournal in 2014 titled, “Mazafaka, from conception to the present day,” Stalker said Djamix had become a core member of the community.
“This guy is everywhere,” Stalker said of Djamix. “There’s not a thing on [Mazafaka] that he doesn’t take part in. For me, he is a stimulus-irritant and thanks to him, Maza is still alive. Our rallying force!”
Djamix told other forum denizens he was a licensed attorney who could be hired for remote or in-person consultations, and his posts on Mazafaka and other Russian boards show several hackers facing legal jeopardy likely took him up on this offer.
“I have the right to represent your interests in court,” Djamix said on the Russian-language cybercrime forum Verified in Jan. 2011. “Remotely (in the form of constant support and consultations), or in person – this is discussed separately. As well as the cost of my services.”
A search on djamix@mazafaka[.]ru at DomainTools.com reveals this address has been used to register at least 10 domain names since 2008. Those include several websites about life in and around Sochi, Russia, the site of the 2014 Winter Olympics, as well as a nearby coastal town called Adler. All of those sites say they were registered to an Aleksei Safronov from Sochi who also lists Adler as a hometown.
The breach tracking service Constella Intelligence finds that the phone number associated with those domains — +7.9676442212 — is tied to a Facebook account for an Aleksei Valerievich Safronov from Sochi. Mr. Safronov’s Facebook profile, which was last updated in October 2022, says his ICQ instant messenger number is 53765. This is the same ICQ number assigned to Djamix in the Mazafaka user database.
A “Djamix” account on the forum privetsochi[.]ru (“Hello Sochi”) says this user was born Oct. 2, 1970, and that his website is uposter[.]ru. This Russian language news site’s tagline is, “We Create Communication,” and it focuses heavily on news about Sochi, Adler, Russia and the war in Ukraine, with a strong pro-Kremlin bent.
Safronov’s Facebook profile also gives his Skype username as “Djamixadler,” and it includes dozens of photos of him dressed in military fatigues along with a regiment of soldiers deploying in fairly remote areas of Russia. Some of those photos date back to 2008.
In several of the images, we can see a patch on the arm of Safronov’s jacket that bears the logo of the Spetsnaz GRU, a special forces unit of the Russian military. According to a 2020 report from the Congressional Research Service, the GRU operates both as an intelligence agency — collecting human, cyber, and signals intelligence — and as a military organization responsible for battlefield reconnaissance and the operation of Russia’s Spetsnaz military commando units.
“In recent years, reports have linked the GRU to some of Russia’s most aggressive and public intelligence operations,” the CRS report explains. “Reportedly, the GRU played a key role in Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and invasion of eastern Ukraine, the attempted assassination of former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom, interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, disinformation and propaganda operations, and some of the world’s most damaging cyberattacks.”
According to the Russia-focused investigative news outlet Meduza, in 2014 the Russian Defense Ministry created its “information-operation troops” for action in “cyber-confrontations with potential adversaries.”
“Later, sources in the Defense Ministry explained that these new troops were meant to ‘disrupt the potential adversary’s information networks,’” Meduza reported in 2018. “Recruiters reportedly went looking for ‘hackers who have had problems with the law.’”
Mr. Safronov did not respond to multiple requests for comment. A 2018 treatise written by Aleksei Valerievich Safronov titled “One Hundred Years of GRU Military Intelligence” explains the significance of the bat in the seal of the GRU.
“One way or another, the bat is an emblem that unites all active and retired intelligence officers; it is a symbol of unity and exclusivity,” Safronov wrote. “And, in general, it doesn’t matter who we’re talking about – a secret GRU agent somewhere in the army or a sniper in any of the special forces brigades. They all did and are doing one very important and responsible thing.”
It’s unclear what role Mr. Safronov plays or played in the GRU, but it seems likely the military intelligence agency would have exploited his considerable technical skills, knowledge and connections on the Russian cybercrime forums.
Searching on Safronov’s domain uposter[.]ru in Constella Intelligence reveals that this domain was used in 2022 to register an account at a popular Spanish-language discussion forum dedicated to helping applicants prepare for a career in the Guardia Civil, one of Spain’s two national police forces. Pivoting on that Russian IP in Constella shows three other accounts were created at the same Spanish user forum around the same date.
Mark Rasch, a former cybercrime prosecutor for the U.S. Department of Justice, said there has always been a close relationship between the GRU and the Russian hacker community. Rasch noted that in the early 2000s, the GRU was soliciting hackers with the skills necessary to hack US banks in order to procure funds to help finance Russia’s war in Chechnya.
“The guy is heavily hooked into the Russian cyber community, and that’s useful for intelligence services,” Rasch said. “He could have been infiltrating the community to monitor it for the GRU. Or he could just be a guy wearing a military uniform.”