USN-5890-1: Open vSwitch vulnerabilities

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Qian Chen discovered that Open vSwitch incorrectly handled certain
Organization Specific TLVs. A remote attacker could use this issue to cause
Open vSwitch to crash, resulting in a denial of service, or possibly
execute arbitrary code.

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Banning TikTok

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Congress is currently debating bills that would ban TikTok in the United States. We are here as technologists to tell you that this is a terrible idea and the side effects would be intolerable. Details matter. There are several ways Congress might ban TikTok, each with different efficacies and side effects. In the end, all the effective ones would destroy the free Internet as we know it.

There’s no doubt that TikTok and ByteDance, the company that owns it, are shady. They, like most large corporations in China, operate at the pleasure of the Chinese government. They collect extreme levels of information about users. But they’re not alone: Many apps you use do the same, including Facebook and Instagram, along with seemingly innocuous apps that have no need for the data. Your data is bought and sold by data brokers you’ve never heard of who have few scruples about where the data ends up. They have digital dossiers on most people in the United States.

If we want to address the real problem, we need to enact serious privacy laws, not security theater, to stop our data from being collected, analyzed, and sold—by anyone. Such laws would protect us in the long term, and not just from the app of the week. They would also prevent data breaches and ransomware attacks from spilling our data out into the digital underworld, including hacker message boards and chat servers, hostile state actors, and outside hacker groups. And, most importantly, they would be compatible with our bedrock values of free speech and commerce, which Congress’s current strategies are not.

At best, the TikTok ban considered by Congress would be ineffective; at worst, a ban would force us to either adopt China’s censorship technology or create our own equivalent. The simplest approach, advocated by some in Congress, would be to ban the TikTok app from the Apple and Google app stores. This would immediately stop new updates for current users and prevent new users from signing up. To be clear, this would not reach into phones and remove the app. Nor would it prevent Americans from installing TikTok on their phones; they would still be able to get it from sites outside of the United States. Android users have long been able to use alternative app repositories. Apple maintains a tighter control over what apps are allowed on its phones, so users would have to “jailbreak”—or manually remove restrictions from—their devices to install TikTok.

Even if app access were no longer an option, TikTok would still be available more broadly. It is currently, and would still be, accessible from browsers, whether on a phone or a laptop. As long as the TikTok website is hosted on servers outside of the United States, the ban would not affect browser access.

Alternatively, Congress might take a financial approach and ban US companies from doing business with ByteDance. Then-President Donald Trump tried this in 2020, but it was blocked by the courts and rescinded by President Joe Biden a year later. This would shut off access to TikTok in app stores and also cut ByteDance off from the resources it needs to run TikTok. US cloud-computing and content-distribution networks would no longer distribute TikTok videos, collect user data, or run analytics. US advertisers—and this is critical—could no longer fork over dollars to ByteDance in the hopes of getting a few seconds of a user’s attention. TikTok, for all practical purposes, would cease to be a business in the United States.

But Americans would still be able to access TikTok through the loopholes discussed above. And they will: TikTok is one of the most popular apps ever made; about 70% of young people use it. There would be enormous demand for workarounds. ByteDance could choose to move its US-centric services right over the border to Canada, still within reach of American users. Videos would load slightly slower, but for today’s TikTok users, it would probably be acceptable. Without US advertisers ByteDance wouldn’t make much money, but it has operated at a loss for many years, so this wouldn’t be its death knell.

Finally, an even more restrictive approach Congress might take is actually the most dangerous: dangerous to Americans, not to TikTok. Congress might ban the use of TikTok by anyone in the United States. The Trump executive order would likely have had this effect, were it allowed to take effect. It required that US companies not engage in any sort of transaction with TikTok and prohibited circumventing the ban. . If the same restrictions were enacted by Congress instead, such a policy would leave business or technical implementation details to US companies, enforced through a variety of law enforcement agencies.

This would be an enormous change in how the Internet works in the United States. Unlike authoritarian states such as China, the US has a free, uncensored Internet. We have no technical ability to ban sites the government doesn’t like. Ironically, a blanket ban on the use of TikTok would necessitate a national firewall, like the one China currently has, to spy on and censor Americans’ access to the Internet. Or, at the least, authoritarian government powers like India’s, which could force Internet service providers to censor Internet traffic. Worse still, the main vendors of this censorship technology are in those authoritarian states. China, for example, sells its firewall technology to other censorship-loving autocracies such as Iran and Cuba.

All of these proposed solutions raise constitutional issues as well. The First Amendment protects speech and assembly. For example, the recently introduced Buck-Hawley bill, which instructs the president to use emergency powers to ban TikTok, might threaten separation of powers and may be relying on the same mechanisms used by Trump and stopped by the court. (Those specific emergency powers, provided by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, have a specific exemption for communications services.) And individual states trying to beat Congress to the punch in regulating TikTok or social media generally might violate the Constitution’s Commerce Clause—which restricts individual states from regulating interstate commerce—in doing so.

Right now, there’s nothing to stop Americans’ data from ending up overseas. We’ve seen plenty of instances—from Zoom to Clubhouse to others—where data about Americans collected by US companies ends up in China, not by accident but because of how those companies managed their data. And the Chinese government regularly steals data from US organizations for its own use: Equifax, Marriott Hotels, and the Office of Personnel Management are examples.

If we want to get serious about protecting national security, we have to get serious about data privacy. Today, data surveillance is the business model of the Internet. Our personal lives have turned into data; it’s not possible to block it at our national borders. Our data has no nationality, no cost to copy, and, currently, little legal protection. Like water, it finds every crack and flows to every low place. TikTok won’t be the last app or service from abroad that becomes popular, and it is distressingly ordinary in terms of how much it spies on us. Personal privacy is now a matter of national security. That needs to be part of any debate about banning TikTok.

This essay was written with Barath Raghavan, and previously appeared in Foreign Policy.

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USN-5889-1: ZoneMinder vulnerabilities

Read Time:1 Minute, 58 Second

It was discovered that ZoneMinder was not properly sanitizing URL
parameters for certain views. An attacker could possibly use this issue to
perform a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. This issue was only fixed in
Ubuntu 16.04 ESM. (CVE-2019-6777)

It was discovered that ZoneMinder was not properly sanitizing stored user
input later printed to the user in certain views. An attacker could
possibly use this issue to perform a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack.
This issue was only fixed in Ubuntu 16.04 ESM. (CVE-2019-6990,
CVE-2019-6992)

It was discovered that ZoneMinder was not properly limiting data size and
not properly performing bound checks when processing username and password
data, which could lead to a stack buffer overflow. An attacker could
possibly use this issue to bypass authentication, cause a denial of
service or execute arbitrary code. This issue was only fixed in Ubuntu
16.04 ESM. (CVE-2019-6991)

It was discovered that ZoneMinder was not properly defining and filtering
data that was appended to the webroot URL of a view. An attacker could
possibly use this issue to perform cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.
This issue was only fixed in Ubuntu 16.04 ESM and Ubuntu 20.04 LTS.
(CVE-2019-7325, CVE-2019-7329)

It was discovered that ZoneMinder was not properly sanitizing stored user
input later printed to the user in certain views. An attacker could
possibly use this issue to perform a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack.
This issue was only fixed in Ubuntu 20.04 LTS. (CVE-2019-7326)

It was discovered that ZoneMinder was not properly sanitizing URL
parameters for certain views. An attacker could possibly use this issue to
perform a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. This issue was only fixed in
Ubuntu 20.04 LTS. (CVE-2019-7327, CVE-2019-7328, CVE-2019-7330,
CVE-2019-7332)

It was discovered that ZoneMinder was not properly sanitizing user input
in the monitor editing view. An attacker could possibly use this issue to
perform a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. This issue was only fixed in
Ubuntu 16.04 ESM and Ubuntu 20.04 LTS. (CVE-2019-7331)

It was discovered that ZoneMinder was not properly sanitizing data related
to file paths in a system. An attacker could possibly use this issue to
execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2022-29806)

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Integrating Cybersecurity in UX design

Read Time:4 Minute, 48 Second

The content of this post is solely the responsibility of the author.  AT&T does not adopt or endorse any of the views, positions, or information provided by the author in this article. 

Image Source: Pexels

Integrating Cybersecurity in UX design

The digital landscape has ensured a wider range of businesses has access to a truly global marketplace. On one hand, this helps bolster a thriving entrepreneurial ecosystem. However, it also means there is a significant amount of competition. If your company’s website or mobile application doesn’t provide a stellar user experience (UX), consumers are able and willing to go elsewhere.

Yet, in the online environment, UX is not your only consideration. There are various threats your business and consumers face from cyber criminals. Therefore, when developing your online tools, you need to adopt effective protections. Unfortunately, many businesses struggle with implementing strong security that doesn’t also disrupt the UX.

Your best approach here is usually to integrate cybersecurity with UX design. So, let’s explore why and how you can achieve this.

How are UX and Cybersecurity related?

One of the mistakes too many businesses make is assuming that UX and cybersecurity are separate aspects of the digital infrastructure. They can certainly have independent intentions to an extent with different goals and actions to achieve these goals. Yet, understanding how they are closely related is the first step to effective integration.

In some ways one can’t — or, at least, shouldn’t — exist without the other. A good example of this is the application of web design in high-stakes sectors, like telehealth care. There are two core types of telehealth services; asynchronous care and synchronous (live) care. While there is a difference here in how patients interact with the medical professional, both types involve the collection and storage of sensitive data. It’s certainly important from a UX perspective to make both asynchronous and live processes as simple and convenient as possible for patients. Yet, this simplicity shouldn’t sacrifice the security of the data.

Clear and strong security protocols give consumers confidence in the system and the company they’re interacting with. This applies to not just healthcare industries but also eCommerce, education, and supply chain sectors, among others. Similarly, consumers may be more likely to adopt more secure behaviors if they can see how it feeds into the convenience and enjoyment of their experience. This means that the UX development process must involve security considerations from the ground up, rather than as an afterthought.

How can you plan effectively?

As with any project, planning is essential to the successful integration of cybersecurity and UX design. An improvisatory approach that involves tacking security or UX elements onto your site or app doesn’t result in a strong development. Wherever possible, your best route is to bring both the UX departments and cybersecurity professionals together in the planning process from the outset. Each department will have insights into one another’s challenges that benefit the project as a whole.

Another key part of your planning process is researching and analyzing your users’ behavior concerning the types of online tools you’re developing. Work with business analytics professionals to understand in what ways security factors into your target demographic’s preferred online experiences. Review what the common security behavior challenges are with your consumers and what experiential elements prevent them from implementing safe actions. This then enables you to create the most apt UX and security arrangements to meet your consumers’ needs.

Importantly, your team needs to plan with balance in mind. They need to make certain that as far as possible, security doesn’t interfere with UX and vice versa. For instance, you may be able to design multiple layers of encryption that require minimal user interaction to activate. Whatever you approach, you must build thorough testing into the planning process. This shouldn’t just be to review efficacy and strength, but also to establish whether there are imbalances that need to be corrected.

What tools can you use?

You should bear in mind that integrating UX and cybersecurity isn’t just a case of developing a unique site or app. Finding this balance is a challenge that businesses have been seeking to address throughout the rise of our digital landscape. This means that there are some existing tools that you can incorporate into your more tailored approach.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly popular here. Even small businesses can access AI tools that take care of many elements of a website and mobile application development. These tools not only save companies time in coding, but they can also make more secure sites by mitigating the potential for human error. Indeed, AI-driven security monitoring software can scan networks in real-time, responding to threats quickly and effectively without disturbing the user experience.

Aside from AI, adopting a single sign-in, multi-factor authentication is a common tool to adopt. This approach provides maximum security by requiring users to authenticate using more than one device. However, it’s important not to disrupt the user flow by ensuring this is a one-time action that allows them to access various aspects of your online space. You should require further authentication only when they navigate away from the site, utilize a new device, or attempt purchases over a certain threshold.

Conclusion

Integrating UX and cybersecurity is not always easy. It’s important to understand that these elements need to coexist to achieve the most positive outcomes. From here, thorough planning that involves collaboration from both security and UX professionals is key to achieving a good balance. Remember that tools like AI and multi-factor authentication can bolster your ability to create a safe service that users enjoy interacting with.

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Cybersecurity in wartime: how Ukraine’s infosec community is coping

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Whenever shells rain down on Ukraine, Yuriy Gatupov’s colleagues put a ‘+’ sign in a chat room. Then, the pluses are counted. “We check if everybody is alive,” he says.

Gatupov, the owner of two cybersecurity companies, says it is vital to stay connected during a time of war. With Russia now controlling around 18% of Ukraine’s territory including Donbas and Crimea, tech workers face formidable challenges. Air raid sirens blast all the time. Explosions are heard in the distance. Power and internet outages are common. Sometimes, code is written in a basement.

To read this article in full, please click here

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perl-HTTP-Daemon-6.16-1.fc37

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FEDORA-2023-424636c7cb

Packages in this update:

perl-HTTP-Daemon-6.16-1.fc37

Update description:

6.16 2023-02-24 03:07:14Z

Bump LWP::UserAgent to 6.37 in TestSuggests (GH#65) (Olaf Alders)

6.15 2023-02-22 22:02:46Z

Fix CVE-2022-31081: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests Correctly handle multiple Content-Length headers and its variants (Theo van Hoesel) Closes “Discrepancies in the Parsing of Content Length header …” (GH#56) (blessingcharles)
kill test server with KILL rather than QUIT (GH#63) (Graham Knop)
Create TestServer test lib for running daemon process (GH#62) (Graham Knop)
Clean up tests (GH#61) (Graham Knop)

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perl-HTTP-Daemon-6.16-1.fc36

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FEDORA-2023-c230cc08c4

Packages in this update:

perl-HTTP-Daemon-6.16-1.fc36

Update description:

6.16 2023-02-24 03:07:14Z

Bump LWP::UserAgent to 6.37 in TestSuggests (GH#65) (Olaf Alders)

6.15 2023-02-22 22:02:46Z

Fix CVE-2022-31081: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests
Correctly handle multiple Content-Length headers and its variants
(Theo van Hoesel)
Closes “Discrepancies in the Parsing of Content Length header …” (GH#56)
(blessingcharles)
kill test server with KILL rather than QUIT (GH#63) (Graham Knop)
Create TestServer test lib for running daemon process (GH#62) (Graham Knop)
Clean up tests (GH#61) (Graham Knop)

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