USN-6518-1: AFFLIB vulnerability

Read Time:14 Second

Luis Rocha discovered that AFFLIB incorrectly handled certain input files.
If a user or automated system were tricked into processing a specially
crafted AFF image file, a remote attacker could possibly use this issue
to cause a denial of service via application crash. (CVE-2018-8050)

Read More

ID Theft Service Resold Access to USInfoSearch Data

Read Time:9 Minute, 7 Second

One of the cybercrime underground’s more active sellers of Social Security numbers, background and credit reports has been pulling data from hacked accounts at the U.S. consumer data broker USinfoSearch, KrebsOnSecurity has learned.

Since at least February 2023, a service advertised on Telegram called USiSLookups has operated an automated bot that allows anyone to look up the SSN or background report on virtually any American. For prices ranging from $8 to $40 and payable via virtual currency, the bot will return detailed consumer background reports automatically in just a few moments.

USiSLookups is the project of a cybercriminal who uses the nicknames JackieChan/USInfoSearch, and the Telegram channel for this service includes a small number of sample background reports, including that of President Joe Biden, and podcaster Joe Rogan. The data in those reports includes the subject’s date of birth, address, previous addresses, previous phone numbers and employers, known relatives and associates, and driver’s license information.

JackieChan’s service abuses the name and trademarks of Columbus, OH based data broker USinfoSearch, whose website says it provides “identity and background information to assist with risk management, fraud prevention, identity and age verification, skip tracing, and more.”

“We specialize in non-FCRA data from numerous proprietary sources to deliver the information you need, when you need it,” the company’s website explains. “Our services include API-based access for those integrating data into their product or application, as well as bulk and batch processing of records to suit every client.”

As luck would have it, my report was also listed in the Telegram channel for this identity fraud service, presumably as a teaser for would-be customers. On October 19, 2023, KrebsOnSecurity shared a copy of this file with the real USinfoSearch, along with a request for information about the provenance of the data.

USinfoSearch said it would investigate the report, which appears to have been obtained on or before June 30, 2023. On Nov. 9, 2023, Scott Hostettler, general manager of USinfoSearch parent Martin Data LLC shared a written statement about their investigation that suggested the ID theft service was trying to pass off someone else’s consumer data as coming from USinfoSearch:

Regarding the Telegram incident, we understand the importance of protecting sensitive information and upholding the trust of our users is our top priority. Any allegation that we have provided data to criminals is in direct opposition to our fundamental principles and the protective measures we have established and continually monitor to prevent any unauthorized disclosure. Because Martin Data has a reputation for high-quality data, thieves may steal data from other sources and then disguise it as ours. While we implement appropriate safeguards to guarantee that our data is only accessible by those who are legally permitted, unauthorized parties will continue to try to access our data. Thankfully, the requirements needed to pass our credentialing process is tough even for established honest companies.

USinfoSearch’s statement did not address any questions put to the company, such as whether it requires multi-factor authentication for customer accounts, or whether my report had actually come from USinfoSearch’s systems.

After much badgering, on Nov. 21 Hostettler acknowledged that the USinfoSearch identity fraud service on Telegram was in fact pulling data from an account belonging to a vetted USinfoSearch client.

“I do know 100% that my company did not give access to the group who created the bots, but they did gain access to a client,” Hostettler said of the Telegram-based identity fraud service. “I apologize for any inconvenience this has caused.”

Hostettler said USinfoSearch heavily vets any new potential clients, and that all users are required to undergo a background check and provide certain documents. Even so, he said, several fraudsters each month present themselves as credible business owners or C-level executives during the credentialing process, completing the application and providing the necessary documentation to open a new account.

“The level of skill and craftsmanship demonstrated in the creation of these supporting documents is incredible,” Hostettler said. “The numerous licenses provided appear to be exact replicas of the original document. Fortunately, I’ve discovered several methods of verification that do not rely solely on those documents to catch the fraudsters.”

“These people are unrelenting, and they act without regard for the consequences,” Hostettler continued. “After I deny their access, they will contact us again within the week using the same credentials. In the past, I’ve notified both the individual whose identity is being used fraudulently and the local police. Both are hesitant to act because nothing can be done to the offender if they are not apprehended. That is where most attention is needed.”

SIM SWAPPER’S DELIGHT

JackieChan is most active on Telegram channels focused on “SIM swapping,” which involves bribing or tricking mobile phone company employees into redirecting a target’s phone number to a device the attackers control. SIM swapping allows crooks to temporarily intercept the target’s text messages and phone calls, including any links or one-time codes for authentication that are delivered via SMS.

Reached on Telegram, JackieChan said most of his clients hail from the criminal SIM swapping world, and that the bulk of his customers use his service via an application programming interface (API) that allows customers to integrate the lookup service with other web-based services, databases, or applications.

“Sim channels is where I get most of my customers,” JackieChan told KrebsOnSecurity. “I’m averaging around 100 lookups per day on the [Telegram] bot, and around 400 per day on the API.”

JackieChan claims his USinfoSearch bot on Telegram abuses stolen credentials needed to access an API used by the real USinfoSearch, and that his service was powered by USinfoSearch account credentials that were stolen by malicious software tied to a botnet that he claims to have operated for some time.

This is not the first time USinfoSearch has had trouble with identity thieves masquerading as legitimate customers. In 2013, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that an identity fraud service in the underground called “SuperGet[.]info” was reselling access to personal and financial data on more than 200 million Americans that was obtained via the big-three credit bureau Experian.

The consumer data resold by Superget was not obtained directly from Experian, but rather via USinfoSearch. At the time, USinfoSearch had a contractual agreement with a California company named Court Ventures, whereby customers of Court Ventures had access to the USinfoSearch data, and vice versa.

When Court Ventures was purchased by Experian in 2012, the proprietor of SuperGet — a Vietnamese hacker named Hieu Minh Ngo who had impersonated an American private investigator — was grandfathered in as a client. The U.S. Secret Service agent who oversaw Ngo’s capture, extradition, prosecution and rehabilitation told KrebsOnSecurity he’s unaware of any other cybercriminal who has caused more material financial harm to more Americans than Ngo.

REAL POLICE, FAKE EDRS

JackieChan also sells access to hacked email accounts belonging to law enforcement personnel in the United States and abroad. Hacked police department emails can come in handy for ID thieves trying to pose as law enforcement officials who wish to purchase consumer data from platforms like USinfoSearch. Hence, Mr. Hostettler’s ongoing battle with fraudsters seeking access to his company’s service.

These police credentials are mainly marketed to criminals seeking fraudulent “Emergency Data Requests,” wherein crooks use compromised government and police department email accounts to rapidly obtain customer account data from mobile providers, ISPs and social media companies.

Normally, these companies will require law enforcement officials to supply a subpoena before turning over customer or user records. But EDRs allow police to bypass that process by attesting that the information sought is related to an urgent matter of life and death, such as an impending suicide or terrorist attack.

In response to an alarming increase in the volume of fraudulent EDRs, many service providers have chosen to require all EDRs be processed through a service called Kodex, which seeks to filter EDRs based on the reputation of the law enforcement entity requesting the information, and other attributes of the requestor.

For example, if you want to send an EDR to Coinbase or Twilio, you’ll first need to have valid law enforcement credentials and create an account at the Kodex online portal at these companies. However, Kodex may still throttle or block any requests from any accounts if they set off certain red flags.

Within their own separate Kodex portals, Twilio can’t see requests submitted to Coinbase, or vice versa. But each can see if a law enforcement entity or individual tied to one of their own requests has ever submitted a request to a different Kodex client, and then drill down further into other data about the submitter, such as Internet address(es) used, and the age of the requestor’s email address.

In August, JackieChan was advertising a working Kodex account for sale on the cybercrime channels, including redacted screenshots of the Kodex account dashboard as proof of access.

Kodex co-founder Matt Donahue told KrebsOnSecurity his company immediately detected that the law enforcement email address used to create the Kodex account pictured in JackieChan’s ad was likely stolen from a police officer in India. One big tipoff, Donahue said, was that the person creating the account did so using an Internet address in Brazil.

“There’s a lot of friction we can put in the way for illegitimate actors,” Donahue said. “We don’t let people use VPNs. In this case we let them in to honeypot them, and that’s how they got that screenshot. But nothing was allowed to be transmitted out from that account.”

Massive amounts of data about you and your personal history are available from USinfoSearch and dozens of other data brokers that acquire and sell “non-FCRA” data — i.e., consumer data that cannot be used for the purposes of determining one’s eligibility for credit, insurance, or employment.

Anyone who works in or adjacent to law enforcement is eligible to apply for access to these data brokers, which often market themselves to police departments and to “skip tracers,” essentially bounty hunters hired to locate others in real life — often on behalf of debt collectors, process servers or a bail bondsman.

There are tens of thousands of police jurisdictions around the world — including roughly 18,000 in the United States alone. And the harsh reality is that all it takes for hackers to apply for access to data brokers (and abuse the EDR process) is illicit access to a single police email account.

The trouble is, compromised credentials to law enforcement email accounts show up for sale with alarming frequency on the Telegram channels where JackieChan and their many clients reside. Indeed, Donahue said Kodex so far this year has identified attempted fake EDRs coming from compromised email accounts for police departments in India, Italy, Thailand and Turkey.

Read More

webkitgtk-2.42.2-1.fc39

Read Time:13 Second

FEDORA-2023-8f84dc8e09

Packages in this update:

webkitgtk-2.42.2-1.fc39

Update description:

Bump Safari version in user agent header.
Fix blob URL regression that broke many websites.
Fix several crashes and rendering issues.
Fix CVE-2023-41983 and CVE-2023-42852

Read More

USN-6508-2: poppler regression

Read Time:44 Second

USN-6508-1 fixed vulnerabilities in poppler. The update introduced
one minor regression in Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. This update fixes the
problem.

We apologize for the inconvenience.

Original advisory details:

It was discovered that poppler incorrectly handled certain malformed PDF
files. If a user or an automated system were tricked into opening a
specially crafted PDF file, a remote attacker could possibly use this
issue to cause a denial of service. This issue only affected Ubuntu 16.04
LTS, Ubuntu 18.04 LTS and Ubuntu 20.04 LTS. (CVE-2020-23804)

It was discovered that poppler incorrectly handled certain malformed PDF
files. If a user or an automated system were tricked into opening a
specially crafted PDF file, a remote attacker could possibly use this
issue to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2022-37050, CVE-2022-37051,
CVE-2022-37052, CVE-2022-38349)

Read More

For want of a cyber nail the kingdom fell

Read Time:4 Minute, 2 Second

An old proverb, dating to at least the 1360’s, states:

“For want of a nail, the shoe was lost,

for want of a shoe, the horse was lost,

for want of a horse, the rider was lost,

for want of a rider, the battle was lost,

for want of a battle, the kingdom was lost,

and all for the want of a horseshoe nail,”

When published in Ben Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Almanack in 1768, it was preceded by the cautionary words:

“a little neglect may breed great mischief”.

This simple proverb and added comment serve as emblematic examples of how seemingly inconsequential missteps or neglect can lead to sweeping, irreversible, catastrophic losses. The cascade of events resonates strongly within the increasingly complex domain of cybersecurity, in which the omission of even the most elementary precaution can result in a spiraling series of calamities.

Indeed, the realm of cybersecurity is replete with elements that bear striking resemblance to the nail, shoe, horse, and rider in this proverb. Consider, for example, the ubiquitous and elementary software patch that may be considered the proverbial digital “nail.” In isolation, this patch might seem trivial, but its role becomes crucial when viewed within the broader network of security measures. The 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack demonstrates the significance of such patches; an unpatched vulnerability in Microsoft Windows allowed the malware to infiltrate hundreds of thousands of computers across the globe. It wasn’t just a single machine that was compromised due to this overlooked ‘nail,’ but entire networks, echoing how a lost shoe leads to a lost horse in the proverb.

This analogy further extends to the human elements of cybersecurity. Personnel tasked with maintaining an organization’s cyber hygiene play the role of the “rider” in our metaphorical tale. However, the rider is only as effective as the horse they ride; likewise, even the most skilled IT professional cannot secure a network if the basic building blocks—the patches, firewalls, and antivirus software—resemble missing nails and shoes. Numerous reports and studies have indicated that human error constitutes one of the most common causes of data breaches, often acting as the ‘rider’ who loses the ‘battle’.

Once the ‘battle’ of securing a particular network or system is lost, the ramifications can extend much further, jeopardizing the broader ‘kingdom’ of an entire organization or, in more extreme cases, critical national infrastructure. One glaring example that serves as a cautionary tale is the Equifax data breach of 2017, wherein a failure to address a known vulnerability resulted in the personal data of 147 million Americans being compromised. Much like how the absence of a single rider can tip the scales of an entire battle, this singular oversight led to repercussions that went far beyond just the digital boundaries of Equifax, affecting millions of individuals and shaking trust in the security of financial systems.

As with any kingdom, a community approach to defense is often the most effective strategy. This involves viewing cybersecurity not merely as a siloed department but as an organizational culture. Research by Singer and Friedman supports this view, emphasizing the importance of fostering a corporate environment where every employee is aware of and committed to best security practices. In the context of the proverb, it’s equivalent to ensuring not just that the rider is skilled but that everyone in the kingdom understands the stakes of the impending battle.

So, how does one protect the ‘kingdom’ in the context of cybersecurity? While the absence of a single ‘nail’ can set off a cascade of failures, the presence of a robust, multi-layered security posture can often prevent the loss of the ‘kingdom.’ This involves a holistic cybersecurity strategy, one that accounts for not only technological defenses but also educates the ‘riders,’ reinforcing that the ‘battle’ is a collective responsibility.

In summary, the proverb “For want of a nail the kingdom was lost” serves as a potent metaphor for the complex, interconnected landscape of cybersecurity. Just as a lost nail can culminate in the loss of a kingdom, so can a single overlooked detail in a cybersecurity framework result in catastrophic outcomes, whether it’s a successful ransomware attack or a large-scale data breach. The wisdom encapsulated in this ancient adage is not merely a cautionary tale; it is a clarion call for vigilance in our increasingly interconnected digital world. A kingdom, after all, is only as strong as its weakest link—or, in this case, its least-attended ‘nail.’

How can AT&T Help?  AT&T’s robust catalog of managed security solutions incorporating detection, prevention, and response capabilities coupled with industry-leading cyber consulting within numerous domains to include secure infrastructure, incidence response and risk management help ensure your kingdom continues to stand tall and does not want for a security nail.

Read More

LSN-0099-1: Kernel Live Patch Security Notice

Read Time:3 Minute, 46 Second

It was discovered that the Xen netback driver in the Linux kernel did not
properly handle packets structured in certain ways. An attacker in a guest
VM could possibly use this to cause a denial of service (host NIC
availability).(CVE-2022-3643)

It was discovered that the virtual terminal driver in the Linux kernel
contained a use-after-free vulnerability. A local attacker could use this
to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly expose sensitive
information (kernel memory).(CVE-2023-3567)

It was discovered that the universal 32bit network packet classifier
implementation in the Linux kernel did not properly perform reference
counting in some situations, leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. A
local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service (system crash)
or possibly execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-3609)

It was discovered that the network packet classifier with
netfilter/firewall marks implementation in the Linux kernel did not
properly handle reference counting, leading to a use-after-free
vulnerability. A local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service
(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-3776)

Kevin Rich discovered that the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel did
not properly handle table rules flush in certain circumstances. A local
attacker could possibly use this to cause a denial of service (system
crash) or execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-3777)

Kevin Rich discovered that the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel did
not properly handle rule additions to bound chains in certain
circumstances. A local attacker could possibly use this to cause a denial
of service (system crash) or execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-3995)

It was discovered that the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel did not
properly handle PIPAPO element removal, leading to a use-after-free
vulnerability. A local attacker could possibly use this to cause a denial
of service (system crash) or execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-4004)

Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng discovered that the Unix domain socket
implementation in the Linux kernel contained a race condition in certain
situations, leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. A local attacker
could use this to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly
execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-4622)

Budimir Markovic discovered that the qdisc implementation in the Linux
kernel did not properly validate inner classes, leading to a use-after-free
vulnerability. A local user could use this to cause a denial of service
(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-4623)

Alex Birnberg discovered that the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel
did not properly validate register length, leading to an out-of- bounds
write vulnerability. A local attacker could possibly use this to cause a
denial of service (system crash).(CVE-2023-4881)

Kevin Rich discovered that the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel did
not properly handle removal of rules from chain bindings in certain
circumstances, leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. A local attacker
could possibly use this to cause a denial of service (system crash) or
execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-5197)

Gwangun Jung discovered that the Quick Fair Queueing scheduler
implementation in the Linux kernel contained an out-of-bounds write
vulnerability. A local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service
(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-31436)

Ross Lagerwall discovered that the Xen netback backend driver in the Linux
kernel did not properly handle certain unusual packets from a
paravirtualized network frontend, leading to a buffer overflow. An attacker
in a guest VM could use this to cause a denial of service (host system
crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-34319)

It was discovered that the bluetooth subsystem in the Linux kernel did not
properly handle L2CAP socket release, leading to a use-after-free
vulnerability. A local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service
(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-40283)

Kyle Zeng discovered that the networking stack implementation in the Linux
kernel did not properly validate skb object size in certain conditions. An
attacker could use this cause a denial of service (system crash) or
possibly execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-42752)

Kyle Zeng discovered that the netfiler subsystem in the Linux kernel did
not properly calculate array offsets, leading to a out-of-bounds write
vulnerability. A local user could use this to cause a denial of service
(system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.(CVE-2023-42753)

Read More