chromium-102.0.5005.115-1.el7

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FEDORA-EPEL-2022-0dde709329

Packages in this update:

chromium-102.0.5005.115-1.el7

Update description:

Update to Chromium 102.0.5005.115 (yes, I know there is a newer one, but we need to get something out now).

This also adds the first build of Chromium for EPEL9, many thanks to all the folks who got the many dependencies built.

Fixes:
CVE-2022-1232 CVE-2022-1364 CVE-2022-1633 CVE-2022-1634 CVE-2022-1635 CVE-2022-1636 CVE-2022-1637 CVE-2022-1638 CVE-2022-1639 CVE-2022-1640 CVE-2022-1641 CVE-2022-1853 CVE-2022-1854 CVE-2022-1855 CVE-2022-1856 CVE-2022-1857 CVE-2022-1858 CVE-2022-1859 CVE-2022-1860 CVE-2022-1861 CVE-2022-1862 CVE-2022-1863 CVE-2022-1864 CVE-2022-1865 CVE-2022-1866 CVE-2022-1867 CVE-2022-1868 CVE-2022-1869 CVE-2022-1870 CVE-2022-1871 CVE-2022-1872 CVE-2022-1873 CVE-2022-1874 CVE-2022-1875 CVE-2022-1876

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Meet the Administrators of the RSOCKS Proxy Botnet

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Authorities in the United States, Germany, the Netherlands and the U.K. last week said they dismantled the “RSOCKS” botnet, a collection of millions of hacked devices that were sold as “proxies” to cybercriminals looking for ways to route their malicious traffic through someone else’s computer. While the coordinated action did not name the Russian hackers allegedly behind RSOCKS, KrebsOnSecurity has identified its owner as a 35-year-old Russian man living abroad who also runs the world’s top Russian spamming forum.

The RUSdot mailer, the email spamming tool made and sold by the administrator of RSOCKS.

According to a statement by the U.S. Department of Justice, RSOCKS offered clients access to IP addresses assigned to devices that had been hacked:

“A cybercriminal who wanted to utilize the RSOCKS platform could use a web browser to navigate to a web-based ‘storefront’ (i.e., a public web site that allows users to purchase access to the botnet), which allowed the customer to pay to rent access to a pool of proxies for a specified daily, weekly, or monthly time period. The cost for access to a pool of RSOCKS proxies ranged from $30 per day for access to 2,000 proxies to $200 per day for access to 90,000 proxies.”

The DOJ’s statement doesn’t mention that RSOCKS has been in operation since 2014, when access to the web store for the botnet was first advertised on multiple Russian-language cybercrime forums.

The user “RSOCKS” on the Russian crime forum Verified changed his name to RSOCKS from a previous handle: “Stanx,” whose very first sales thread on Verified in 2016 quickly ran afoul of the forum’s rules and prompted a public chastisement by the forum’s administrator.

Verified was hacked twice in the past few years, and each time the private messages of all users on the forum were leaked. Those messages show that after being warned of his forum infraction, Stanx sent a private message to the Verified administrator detailing his cybercriminal bona fides.

“I am the owner of the RUSdot forum (former Spamdot),” Stanx wrote in Sept. 2016. “In spam topics, people know me as a reliable person.”

A Google-translated version of the Rusdot spam forum.

RUSdot is the successor forum to Spamdot, a far more secretive and restricted forum where most of the world’s top spammers, virus writers and cybercriminals collaborated for years before the community’s implosion in 2010. Even today, the RUSdot Mailer is advertised for sale at the top of the RUSdot community forum.

Stanx said he was a longtime member of several major forums, including the Russian hacker forum Antichat (since 2005), and the Russian crime forum Exploit (since April 2013). In an early post to Antichat in January 2005, Stanx disclosed that he is from Omsk, a large city in the Siberian region of Russia.

According to the cyber intelligence firm Intel 471, the user Stanx indeed registered on Exploit in 2013, using the email address stanx@rusdot.com, and the ICQ number 399611. A search in Google for that ICQ number turns up a cached version of a Vkontakte profile for a Denis “Neo” Kloster, from Omsk, Russia.

Cybersecurity firm Constella Intelligence shows that in 2017, someone using the email address istanx@gmail.com registered at the Russian freelancer job site fl.ru with the profile name of “Denis Kloster” and the Omsk phone number of 79136334444.

That phone number is tied to the WHOIS registration records for multiple domain names over the years, including proxy[.]info, allproxy[.]info, kloster.pro and deniskloster.com.

A copy of the passport for Denis Kloster, as posted to his Vkontakte page in 2019. It shows that in Oct. 2019, he obtained a visa from the American Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand.

The “about me” section of DenisKloster.com says the 35-year-old was born in Omsk, that he got his first computer at age 12, and graduated from high school at 16. Kloster says he’s worked in many large companies in Omsk as a system administrator, web developer and photographer.

According to Kloster’s blog, his first real job was running an “online advertising” firm he founded called Internet Advertising Omsk (“riOmsk“), and that he even lived in New York City for a while.

“Something new was required and I decided to leave Omsk and try to live in the States,” Kloster wrote in 2013. “I opened an American visa for myself, it was not difficult to get. And so I moved to live in New York, the largest city in the world, in a country where all wishes come true. But even this was not enough for me, and since then I began to travel the world.”

The current version of the About Me page on Kloster’s site says he closed his advertising business in 2013 to travel the world and focus on his new company: One that provides security and anonymity services to customers around the world. Kloster’s vanity website and LinkedIn page both list him as CEO of a company called “SL MobPartners.”

In 2016, Deniskloster.com featured a post celebrating three years in operation. The anniversary post said Kloster’s anonymity business had grown to nearly two dozen employees, all of whom were included in a group photo posted to that article (and some of whom Kloster thanked by their first names and last initials).

The employees who kept things running for RSOCKS, circa 2016.

“Thanks to you, we are now developing in the field of information security and anonymity!,” the post enthuses. “We make products that are used by thousands of people around the world, and this is very cool! And this is just the beginning!!! We don’t just work together and we’re not just friends, we’re Family.”

Mr. Kloster did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

It’s not clear if the coordinated takedown targeting the RSOCKS botnet will be permanent, as the botnet’s owners could simply rebuild — and possibly rebrand — their crime machine. But the malware-based proxy services have struggled to remain competitive in a cybercrime market with increasingly sophisticated proxy services that offer many additional features.

The demise of RSOCKS follows closely on the heels of VIP72[.]com, a competing proxy botnet service that operated for a decade before its owners pulled the plug on the service last year.

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Understanding the Ransomware Ecosystem: From Screen Lockers to Multimillion-Dollar Criminal Enterprise

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A new report from Tenable Research explores the key players in the ransomware ecosystem and the tactics that have helped propel it from a fledgling cyberthreat into a force to be reckoned with.

Ransomware is a constantly evolving cyberthreat, and it is through its evolution that ransomware has managed to not only survive, but thrive.

There are a number of reports that detail ransomware’s evolution, from the earliest form of ransomware known as the AIDS (or PC Cyborg) Trojan in 1989 to its transition into screen locker ransomware and, ultimately, the cryptolocker ransomware that encrypts files on systems. This type of ransomware became the basis for how modern ransomware operates.

Screen locker ransomware relied on fear tactics targeting individual users, using law enforcement imagery of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and UK’s Metropolitan Police Service (the Met), along with text claiming that the victim had accessed pornographic or child abuse content from their computer. These victims were instructed to pay a “fine,” which was typically between $100-500, in order to unlock their systems. In reality, these users could regain access to their systems without payment, as none of their files were tampered with.

Over the last four years, ransomware has skyrocketed into a multimillion-dollar, self-sustaining industry. It has become a part of the routine experience for organizations following noteworthy attacks against critical infrastructure like the Colonial Pipeline or JBS Foods attacks in 2021.

Image Source: Security Boulevard

Underpinning the success of today’s ransomware is what’s called the ransomware ecosystem. In our latest report, we explore the key players that shape the ransomware ecosystem and the tactics that have helped propel ransomware into the most dominant threat to organizations today

What you’ll get from this report:

A better understanding of how the ransomware ecosystem evolved
The most common attack vectors used by the players in the ecosystem
Guidance on how to prepare and defend against ransomware attacks
A list of the vulnerabilities likely to be exploited in ransomware attacks

Get more information

Download the full report here
Attend the webinar: Tenable’s Ransomware Ecosystem Report: Understanding the Key Players, Common Attack Vectors and Ways You Can Avoid Becoming a Victim
Blog post about The Ransomware Ecosystem Tenable.sc Dashboard
Blog post about The Ransomware Ecosystem Tenable.sc Report
Follow Tenable’s Security Response Team on the Tenable Community

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Symbiote Backdoor in Linux

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Interesting:

What makes Symbiote different from other Linux malware that we usually come across, is that it needs to infect other running processes to inflict damage on infected machines. Instead of being a standalone executable file that is run to infect a machine, it is a shared object (SO) library that is loaded into all running processes using LD_PRELOAD (T1574.006), and parasitically infects the machine. Once it has infected all the running processes, it provides the threat actor with rootkit functionality, the ability to harvest credentials, and remote access capability.

News article:

Researchers have unearthed a discovery that doesn’t occur all that often in the realm of malware: a mature, never-before-seen Linux backdoor that uses novel evasion techniques to conceal its presence on infected servers, in some cases even with a forensic investigation.

No public attribution yet.

So far, there’s no evidence of infections in the wild, only malware samples found online. It’s unlikely this malware is widely active at the moment, but with stealth this robust, how can we be sure?

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